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Abstract
DAVID C. KERSHAW: Education Outcomes, Party Contacting, and
Change in Party Identification.
(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz.)
This dissertation presents three studies that challenge the conventional understand-
ing about the ways in which political elites influence citizens’ orientations toward, as
well as the citizens’ resources that bear upon, political participation. The studies ques-
tion assumptions about the intent and consequences of elite behavior in three distinct,
but related substantive literatures. These literatures include: electoral contacting,
party identification formation, and state education outcomes.
The first study helps explain the long observed pattern where political elites dis-
proportionately contact the socioeconomically and politically advantaged during elec-
tions despite theory from the campaign mobilization literature that argues contacting
will have the most influence on individuals who are socioeconomically and politically
disadvantaged. This paradox is explained once one recognizes that contacting dur-
ing elections serves divergent goals that are tied to the election cycle and to election
competitiveness. Broadly speaking, contacting in elections should be seen as having
two participatory recruitment stages: a resource gathering stage-with resources coming
from the advantaged-and a mass-mobilization stage-where every vote counts only when
elections are competitive.
The second study challenges the idea that political parties and their operatives
only alter party identities through a few indirect mechanisms: strategic positioning on
issues and performance of elected officials. Rather, this study argues that campaign
iii
contacts have the unanticipated consequence of offering opportunities for behavioral
reinforcement of citizens’ party identities.
The final study reassesses the racial discrimination explanation for the persistent
relationship between statewide diversity and poor education outcomes. While this
study reaffirms the existence of the pattern, a critical finding is that socioeconomic
status and other conventional explanations are better at predicting poor education
outcomes than state level diversity. By probing more deeply, this study also discovers
that white student outcomes drive the association between diversity and outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
My dissertation presents three studies that challenge the conventional understanding
about the ways in which political elites influence citizens’ orientations toward, as well
as the citizens’ resources that bear upon, political participation. The studies question
assumptions about the intent and consequences of elite behavior in three distinct, but
related substantive literatures. These literatures include: electoral contacting, party
identification formation, and state education outcomes.
The first study challenges the long held belief that political elites always set out
to disproportionately contact the socioeconomically and politically advantaged during
elections despite theory from the campaign mobilization literature that argues contact-
ing will have the most influence on individuals who are socioeconomically or politically
disadvantaged. While the evidence does persistently show that the advantaged are dis-
proportionately contacted during elections, I argue this disconnect between theory and
evidence is explained once one recognizes that contacting during elections serves diver-
gent goals that are tied to the election cycle and to election competitiveness. Broadly
speaking, contacting in elections should be seen as having two participatory recruitment
stages: a resource gathering stage-with resources coming from the advantaged-and a
mass-mobilization stage-where every vote counts only when elections are competitive.
Overall, I theorize that once we account for the conditional nature of recruitment strate-
gies, we should see that campaigns do contact a broad and representative segment of
society; even if this only occurs when elections are competitive.
In terms of the substantive influence of contacting, the literature portrays campaign
contacting as primarily altering political participation and vote choice. Further, the
literature also suggests the effects of contacting are generally limited. I take issue with
this characterization and argue that this literature underestimates the importance of
campaign contacts on political behavior and attitudes. Specifically, in my second study
I argue that campaign mobilization and recruitment efforts also have the unintended
consequence of altering party identities through behavioral reinforcement.
According to the behavioral reinforcement theory of party identification (Converse
& Markus, 1979), a citizen’s bond to a party is created and/or strengthened each time
he or she votes for that party. Since, campaign contacts are recognized to influence both
the turnout and vote choice decisions-two steps necessary for translating latent affect
into identity, I theorize that contacts must alter party identities, if only indirectly.
At the same time, I also argue the vote is not the only participatory opportunity
campaigns offer. If an important mechanism for identity formation is behaviorally
supporting a party, those performing other core campaign tasks (e.g., giving money)
should also develop stronger bonds to the parties. While this study establishes the
relationship between contacts and party identities, one implication of the theory (given
the persistence of party identities), is that campaign contacts may have effects on
participation and vote choice that last well beyond the current election.
The final study questions the degree to which state political elites in diverse states
are successfully able to place barriers that result in poor education outcomes for mi-
norities. At issue is the persistent relationship between statewide diversity and poor
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education outcomes noted in the state politics literature. Although a variety of explana-
tions exist for this pattern, one influential strain of research–the Racial Diversity Theory
of State Politics–suggests this pattern results largely from discrimination in state level
politics (Hero & Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998; Hero, 2007). Unfortunately, this research
does not adequately account for the background of the students or local forces; the
factors the education outcomes literature says largely drive education outcomes. This
omission along with several other theoretical and methodological considerations leads
me to theorize that this prior research may overstate and/or mischaracterize the role of
statewide discrimination in education outcomes. I argue a better specified model will
show socioeconomic factors and other conventional explanations play a much greater
role in outcomes for all students than this research cedes.
While this study of elite behavior does not directly address a question of how elites
affect political behavior, it does directly impact the conclusions drawn from the political
participation literature. This literature generally concludes that racial disparities in
participation are modest to nonexistent once socio-economic status is accounted for
in the models (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). However, this conclusion may be
premature if state actors are highly successful at instituting barriers that result in poor
education outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Mobilizing the Mobilized: The
Electoral Recruitment Paradox
The classic theory of participation recruitment suggests that parties and politicians
mobilize the people they know, those at the center of social contacts, those most likely
to effectively produce desired outcomes, and those likely to participate in response to
recruitment efforts (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry,
1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). These characteristics represent individuals
with resources, deep social networks, capacity for action, and susceptibility to recruit-
ment effort (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry, 1996;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). That is, “the
wealthy, the educated, and the partisan” (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, p.32).
At the same time, researchers also argue that elections are ultimately about votes,
and theory indicates that those who have the most potential for participation will likely
vote without prompting and others will not vote even if encouraged (Brady, Schlozman
and Verba, 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Thus, rational prospectors should
focus on those at the margins of participation. If participatory mobilization has the
most influence on individuals who are not likely to be socio-economic or political elites,
why would much of the literature assume, and survey evidence show, that elites are
disproportionately recruited to participate in elections (Abramson and Claggett, 2001;
Gershtenson, 2003; Krueger, 2006; Niven, 2002, 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993)?
2.1 Two Strategic Recruitment Stages
This paper sorts out this paradox by establishing that participatory recruitment during
elections serves several divergent but complimentary goals that are explicitly tied to
the timing within the election cycle and the competitiveness of the election. Broadly
speaking, elections should be seen as having two recruitment stages: the first a resource
gathering stage, and the second a mobilization stage.
The resource gathering stage involves the preelection day organizational buildup
and operation. From early in an election until election day, a campaign must establish
and maintain a basic organizational structure designed to respond to developments in
the environment and to achieve the campaign’s election goals. This means two things
from a participant recruitment standpoint.
First, campaigns need to find activists to run all aspects of the operation. This
includes everything from running the phone banks to making strategic resource allo-
cation decisions. However, campaigns do not want just anyone filling these positions.
The ideal participants have commitment and capacity; they are willing and able to
effectively complete the tasks they are given.
Second, commitment and capacity alone are insufficient to win elections. Campaigns
also need cash to fund the activities of the campaign operatives. Simply, campaigns
need those willing and able to give lots of money.
In sum, these operational resource needs force strategic elites to spend most of
the election seeking support from the committed, the skilled, and the wealthy. The
implication is that the individuals recruited in this stage of the election will epitomize
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the classic socio-economic and political elite, as these individuals are most likely to
have and to provide the resources the campaigns need (Brady, Schlozman and Verba,
1999; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Fenno, 1978; Nie, Juan and Stehlik-Barry,
1996; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).1
However, campaign resource recruitment needs change over the course of an election.
As election day nears, campaigns turn from focusing on recruiting activists and raising
money towards getting supporters to the polls. Yet, campaigns must make choices
about the nature and purposes served by the mobilization efforts. In effect, campaigns
need to ask themselves, “Is this election going to be close?” and related, “Is it worth
the time, effort and money to launch a full vote mobilization effort?”
If the answer to both questions is yes, the election is competitive and the campaign
should direct mobilization efforts towards maximizing supporter turnout. Theoretically,
elites should use available information to mobilize marginal voters in order to maximize
turnout (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Rosenstone and
Hansen, 1993).2
Given that the campaigns have already recruited many of the habitual voters in the
resource gathering phase, campaigns could succeed in reaching the marginal voter by
1Note that campaigns do contact a broad swatch of the public during the vote identification phase.
However, campaigns try to prevent mobilizing out-partisans during the contact. Consequently, this
approach results in many of the contacts being unaware of the contact, let alone being asked to
participate.
2Marginal voters are those with around a 50 percent probability of voting. The literature assumes
some individuals are virtually certain to vote, while others are certain not to vote. The expectation
of a nonlinear association between mobilization efforts and turnout presumably arises from a pattern
of diminishing returns associated with the benefits (selective, solidary, or purposive) provided by the
campaign contact. Extra benefits will not greatly add to the reasons for voting. These individuals
already likely receive high levels of benefits from voting (i.e., those with a high sense of duty and
strong partisan attachments, the habitual voter) and will vote regardless of the contact. Mobilizing
them will not add votes to the candidates. Conversely, some individuals are likely to receive very low
levels of benefits (i.e., a socially isolated individual with no civic duty who works three jobs) such that
the benefits provided by the campaign will not greatly increase his vote probability. Mobilizing these
individuals will also not add votes to the candidates.
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targeting the remaining registered voters, regardless of their socio-economic status. The
unregistered clearly cannot help the candidate, as they have zero vote potential. Mo-
bilizing the unregistered represents a pure waste of resources. Targeting the remaining
registered voters as a strategy arises from the fact that a variety of factors (i.e., interest,
duty, issues, etc.) play an important role in the vote decision while they simultaneously
do not perfectly covary with socio-economics. Furthermore, each citizen’s mix of these
factors remains largely unknown to campaigns despite the early stage efforts. Con-
sequently, rational prospectors cannot simply recruit the center of the socio-economic
distribution and hope to reach the optimal targets. “Rational prospectors” (Brady,
Schlozman and Verba, 1999) should reach out to all registered voters relatively equally,
with contacting priorities made using any information they have acquired.
In contrast, as election day approaches, if an election appears to be uncompetitive,
campaigns will use their organizational structures to loosely mobilize in order to achieve
objectives other than vote maximization. Other present and future oriented objectives
served by vote mobilization may include: training, or building the morale of, the cam-
paign staff; maintaining or expanding their resources (or resource base) for the current
or future elections (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Goodliffe,
2004); getting disabled partisans to the polls; and simply maintaining a certain vote
level.3 In fact, prior research fundamentally errs by failing to account for the fact that
vote maximization arguments are clearly germane only in competitive elections, and
by failing to recognize that inequalities in recruitment should emerge wherever vote
maximization does not strictly guide electoral recruitment strategies in the late stage.
Voters only carry equal weight when elites recruit participants to maximize the vote.
3Note that uncompetitive elections consistently show evidence of substantial contacting rates. For
example in the 2000 presidential election, contacting rates in nonbattleground states were a nontrivial
35%. The last minute nature of these contacts suggests vote mobilization. Data from midterm un-
contested elections in states with no Senate elections show similar results. NES data from 1978-2002
indicate a contacting rate by the two major parties of approximately 23% under these conditions.
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The targeted recruit should be the socio-economically and/or politically advantaged if
the goal of the contact is some other participatory act.
The failure of prior research to recognize that campaigns have time and condition
varying resource needs–and, by implication, the failure to differentiate among key sub-
populations, recruited for distinct purposes at specific times in the election–may help
to explain the apparent socioeconomic bias seen in most studies of electoral recruit-
ment. At a minimum, studies of electoral recruitment must account for differences in
the strategic goals served by early, late-competitive, and late-uncompetitive election
recruitment efforts. Doing so will not only shed light on the strategic purpose and tim-
ing of different forms of recruitment, but should also show that elites strategically hunt
for resources and activists for most of the election before turning to vote mobilization
in the late stage. Further, this approach should show that elites only vote maximize
under truly competitive conditions.
2.2 Methodology and Measurement
To test these expectations I turn to the 2000 presidential election and the National
Annenberg Election Study (NAES) pre-post general election panel study. The NAES
focuses on a single election and uses a rolling cross-sectional design, providing the
ability to distinguish early contacts from late. The NAES also contains individuals
in both competitive and uncompetitive situations, allowing us to see how contacting
strategy varies with competitiveness.4 Unfortunately, the 2004 NAES does not ask the
appropriate questions to enable testing the theory, so the test is restricted to 2000.
This study separates the resource gathering stage analysis from the mobilization
stage analyses. For the purpose of this study, October 31, 2000 marks the beginning
4While the theory is applied in a presidential election, the patterns should manifest in any election.
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of the mobilization stage and the end of resource gathering stage.5 Assuming that
the mobilization period starts just seven days before the general election follows other
mobilization research and recognizes that mobilization efforts close to elections are the
most effective (Nickerson, 2007).
Each stage analysis will use the same set of variables to predict whether an individ-
ual was contacted by either of the major parties in the specific stage. These analyses use
self-reported responses to the Annenberg pre and post “contact with the campaigns”
questions to establish who was contacted by the campaigns.6 The pre-election con-
tacting battery was used to create the contacted dependent variable in the early stage
analyses. Individuals who reported being contacted in the pre-election survey and were
interviewed prior October 31, 2000 were coded as early contacts. Individuals who only
report a contact in the post-election survey, or reported a contact in the pre-election
5The same substantive conclusions emerge under several alternative mobilization stage start dates–
such as three days before the general election, or state registration deadline. These results are available
on request. Overall, NAES sampling resulted in only about 43% of the NAES panel being asked if
they were contacted by the campaigns in the pre-election survey. All panel respondents were asked
about contact with the campaigns in the post election survey. However, this study’s analyses focus on
the subset of respondents who were asked about their contact with the parties in both waves.
6Unfortunately, the NAES uses two similar but different questions to gage respondents contact
with the campaigns in the pre and post election surveys. Up through November 6, 2000, the NAES
asks respondents, “During the campaign, has anyone from one of the campaigns talked to you in
person or on the phone about the presidential election?” After the election the NAES asks, “Dur-
ing the campaign this fall, did any of the campaigns contact you about the presidential election?”
The question wording shift could cause inter-stage comparability problems. Contacting could include
countless forms of interaction including bulk mail, door hangers, phone calls, and face-to-face canvass-
ing. Several considerations make this an unnecessary worry. First, people perform relatively shallow
searches for information in order to answer poll questions (Zaller, 1992). We also know that the
everyday environment individuals face contains far more stimuli than working memory can process
(Steenbergen and Lodge, 2003a). Thus, available information includes only that which captured the
individual’s attention for more than a fleeting moment. For most people, most of the time, bulk mail
contacting will never making it into long-term memory as mail simply will not activate the surveillance
system. Alternatively, we train ourselves to respond to knocks at the door or the ring of the phone.
This increases the probability that an individual archives these events in long-term memory. Thus,
responses to these questions should largely reflect these forms of contacting. Comparing the reported
NAES cross-section contacting rates for the ambiguous question wording with the contacting rate of a
2000 National Election Study (NES) question resembling the NAES preelection question demonstrates
nearly identical contacting rates, 31.9% and 32.5% in the NES cross-section.
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survey but were interviewed after October 30, 2000, were coded as late contacts.7
The existence of two separate participant contacting stages, and distinctiveness of
elite strategies, are strongly implied when we take a look at the simple monthly plots of
the percentage of the population who reported a campaign contact (see Figure 1.1). The
NAES rolling cross-section and panel data both establish that presidential campaigns
quickly seek out a small number of citizens (under five percent of the population) but
do not openly contact the vast majority of citizens until the very last moments of the
campaign.8 This pattern strongly suggests that mass vote mobilization did not occur
in the primary phase. Conversely, it is consistent with the idea that campaigns focus
their participatory recruitment activities on involving a core segment of the population
to handle most of their campaign needs.
7A small number of the individuals interviewed after October 31 in the pre-election survey reported
a campaign contact in the pre-election battery but did not report the contact in the post-election
survey. Consequently, both questions were used to identify late contacted individuals.
8Figure 1 also shows that the panel data closely match the cross-section, speaking to the gener-
alizability of the panel data. It also suggests that large portions of the population simply are not
forgetting they were primary mass-mobilized.
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2.3 Resource Gathering Stage Analysis & Results
The resource gathering stage analysis uses variables that reflect election relevant in-
formation, citizens’ geographic locations, citizens’ integration in their communities,
and the standard recruitment variables to predict early campaign contact.9 Income,
educational attainment, political knowledge, partisanship, and self-employment sta-
tus variables represent money, commitment, capacity, and the other resources desired
by political elites (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 1999; Brady, Verba and Schlozman,
1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).10 Increas-
ing levels of resources should coincide with an increased likelihood of being contacted
in the resource gathering stage. While, (log of) length at residence, a set of place of
residence dummies, registration status, gubernatorial or senatorial election competi-
tiveness, native son, and disability status variables capture those factors shown to alter
the likelihood of being vote mobilized.11 The likelihood of being vote mobilized should
increase with length at residence, being registered to vote, living in a state with other
competitive elections, living in more urbanized areas, being disabled, and living in one
of the candidate’s home states. The fact that contextual differences in the likelihood of
being contacted emerge in the late stage (even in battleground states) reflects the re-
ality that campaigns cannot contact all potential voters. Thus, these variables capture
some of the strategies campaigns use to reach the most voters given limited (use of)
resources. For example, campaigns disproportionately target densely populated areas
9A description of each of the variables used in the analyses is found in Table 2.4 at the end of the
chapter.
10Self-employment status does not appear directly in prior research. However, its inclusion derives
directly from contacting/mobilization theory. This research argues elites seek out those with time,
resources, and those central to dense social networks. The self-employed often have all of these
characteristics.
11Using the log of length at residence accounts for a positive but diminishing increased likelihood of
being contacted for each additional day living at the same address.
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with their mobilization effort because it takes less effort to reach an equal or greater
number of voters in these areas than it would a rural area of equal size. Similarly, the
inclusion of controls for the candidates’ home states and for other competitive elections
attempts to account for well established campaign operations and for the coordinated
use of multiple ongoing campaign organizations, respectively. In order to maintain
consistency with the literature, age and marital status were added as controls.
However, the existence of primaries during this period raises the possibility of vote
mass-mobilization. Consequently, a control for primary season was also incorporated in
the model. Individuals living in states where primaries were held prior to the date John
McCain dropped out of the race were coded one, all others zero.12 A logit analysis is
used to estimate how well these variables alter the likelihood of an early stage contact.
In addition to looking at specific indicators, this study argues that support for or
against the theory will be found by looking at clusters of variables and how they do or
do not explain contacting in each stage. Specifically, I expect that commitment and ca-
pacity indicators such as income, strength of partisanship, education, self-employment
status, and knowledge will predict early stage contacting, but not late stage, competi-
tive election contacting. Because vote maximization should not guide mobilization and
because campaigns always need money, wealthy individuals should still be the focus of
late stage contacts in nonbattleground states. However, the effects of the other resource
variables should diminish as the need to recruit large numbers for difficult participatory
acts has passed.
In contrast, the mobilization and contextual variables (e.g., registration status, place
of residence, log of length of residence, other competitive elections, and native son) will
12Several other controls were used to try to find significant primary mobilization effects. Some of
these included: using the date Bush officially reached the minimum number of delegates to mark the
end of the competitive primary season and using a variable that captured each individual’s state order
in the primary season. None of these variables found primary mass-mobilization effects.
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help to predict late stage contacting but not early stage contacting. Simply, the vote
mobilization indicators should only predict contacting when vote mobilization occurs;
in the final days of an election.
Consistent with expectations, strategic elites target strong partisans, the wealthy,
the self-employed, and the politically knowledgeable in the resource gathering stage (see
Table 2.1). That is, elites target individuals ideal for demanding participatory acts.
Furthermore, it is notable that the measures that the theory suggests predict late
recruitment (i.e., living in a battleground state and being a registered voter) fail to
account for mobilization at this stage. Joint tests of significance reinforce the idea
that these variables do not contribute to our understanding of contacting in this stage
(χ28 = 3.50 p = .899). This is consistent with the argument that an individual’s capacity
and resources matter more at this stage than factors that might be directly associated
with mobilizing turnout.
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Table 2.1: Predicting Resource Gathering Stage Contact with Individual and Contex-
tual Characteristics
Resource Gathering Stage Contact
Commitment & Capacity Variables
Weak Partisan -0.639*
(0.288)
Independent Leaner -0.789*
(0.327)
Independent -0.328
(0.446)
Political Knowledge 0.431*
(0.136)
Educational Attainment 0.065
(0.056)
Income 0.152*
(0.071)
Self-employed 0.668*
(0.279)
Mobilization & Contextual Variables
Registered Voter 0.560
(0.537)
Battleground State -0.124
(0.257)
Time at Residence 0.096
(0.126)
Urban Resident 0.032
(0.334)
Suburban Resident 0.078
(0.296)
Native Son -0.128
(0.415)
Competitive Race -0.241
(0.251)
Competitive Primary -0.060
(0.242)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1: – Continued
Resource Gathering Stage Contact
Demographic Controls
Disabled 0.674
(0.624)
Age 0.007
(0.009)
Married -0.530*
(0.240)
Constant -6.566*
(0.871)
N. of cases 2368
chi-squared 57.080
pseudo R-squared 0.075
* p < 0.05; Source: 2000 NAES panel data (pre-election battery up through
10/31/00).
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The impact of money on the likelihood of contacting is impressive. Table 2.2 shows
the effect of income simultaneously controlling for strength of partisanship, knowledge
level, and whether someone was self-employed. The predicted effect of earning over
$150,000 annually translates to having an approximately three-fold increase in the
predicted probability of campaign contact in this stage, compared to those earning less
than $10,000. Clearly, more knowledge, strong partisanship, and being self-employed
all enhance the probability of contact. Overall, the predicted probabilities reported in
Table 2.2 corroborate the importance of both commitment and social placement for the
likelihood of early contacting.13
Interestingly, living in a state with a competitive primary did not increase the
probability of a contact in the early stage of the 2000 election.14 This is consistent with
a nationwide search for resources (Gimpel, Lee and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008).
13Note that Table 2.2 presents only weak and strong partisans because independents and independent
leaners are statistically indistinguishable from weak partisans in the likelihood of being contacted.
14In a separate analysis, an interaction between the primary control and republican identifiers did
not show any party specific mass-mobilizing efforts.
17
Table 2.2: Predicted Probabilities of an Early Stage Contact for Different Combina-
tions of Income, Strength of Partisanship, Knowledge Levels, and Self-employment
Status
Weak Partisan Strong Partisan
Knowledge Very Poor Average Excellent Very Poor Average Excellent
Not Self-employed
$10,000 .005 .011 .027 .011 .025 .057
$15,000 .006 .013 .031 .012 .029 .065
$25,000 .007 .015 .036 .014 .033 .075
$35,000 .008 .018 .041 .017 .038 .086
$50,000 .009 .021 .048 .019 .044 .099
$75,000 .010 .024 .055 .022 .051 .114
$100,000 .012 .028 .063 .026 .059 .130
$150,000 .014 .032 .073 .030 .068 .148
Over $150,000 .016 .037 .084 .035 .079 .168
Self-employed
$10,000 .009 .022 .050 .020 .047 .105
$15,000 .011 .025 .058 .024 .054 .120
$25,000 .013 .030 .067 .028 .063 .137
$35,000 .015 .034 .077 .032 .072 .156
$50,000 .017 .040 .089 .037 .083 .177
$75,000 .020 .046 .102 .043 .095 .200
$100,000 .023 .053 .117 .049 .109 .225
$150,000 .027 .061 .133 .057 .125 .253
Over $150,000 .031 .070 .152 .066 .143 .283
Notes: These predicted probabilities are created with all nonpresented continuous
variables set to their mean and dummy variables set to zero.
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2.4 Mobilization Stage Analysis & Results
The second analysis takes the same set of variables used in the resource gathering stage
analysis and attempts to predict late-stage election contact. However, in the mobi-
lization stage analysis, I interact the battleground dummy with all of the variables
used in the model to distinguish late battleground and nonbattleground contacts.15
Interacting the battleground state indicator with each variable in the model allows us
to test whether the variables have different effects (slopes) in the battleground and
nonbattleground states. These analyses also include a dummy for those who first re-
ported a campaign contact in the resource gathering (early) stage.16 The continuous
and registered voter variables were centered to reduce collinearity.17
Turning to the mobilization stage in nonbattleground states, the results indicate
parties do not attempt to reach out to all voters equally in the vote mobilization stage in
uncompetitive elections.18 The significance of the income variable in Table 2.3 indicates
that, even in this late stage, campaigns actively seek out individuals with money. In
fact, the magnitude of income’s impact on recruitment probabilities is comparable to
15States are distinguished according to Shaw’s (2006) “the ’real’ real list” of battleground states.
Battleground states include Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin.
16Theoretically, battleground states should be similar to nonbattleground states in the resource
gathering stage. Money and activists are valuable regardless of where they originate. Consequently,
this study only uses interaction terms to distinguish competitive from uncompetitive elections in the
late stage. To be sure, additional analyses explicitly tested for differences between battleground and
nonbattleground states in the resource gathering stage. Both classes of states demonstrated similar
contacting patterns in this stage (available upon request).
17Despite these measures, the battleground indicator fails to achieve significance due to irresolvable
collinearity (VIF=9.97).
18The first column in Table 2.3 gives the effects of the variables in nonbattleground states. The
second column lists the coefficients for the interactions between the variables and the battleground
state indicator. These coefficients tell us whether, and to what degree, the variables perform differently
in predicting battleground state contacts. The third column is the linear combination of the first two
columns and presents the expected effects of the variables in the battleground states.
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that of the early stage. This is consistent with presidential campaigns continuing to
gather resources. This is not surprising as the hunt for money is continuous and usually
continues on even after an election is over. However, less immediately valued resources
such as political knowledge, self-employment, and strength of partisanship notably fail
to influence late stage contact probabilities; individually or jointly (χ27 = 8.94 p =
0.257).
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Table 2.3: Predicting Mobilization Stage Contact with Individual and Contextual
Characteristics
Nonbattleground Contact Interaction Battleground Effect
Commitment & Capacity Variables
Weak Partisan -0.123 -0.080 -0.203
(0.135) (0.232) (-0.189)
Independent Leaner -0.091 -0.074 -.164
(0.146) (0.251) (.204)
Independent -0.190 -0.109 -.299
(0.225) (0.396) (.326)
Political Knowledge 0.015 0.075 .090
(0.061) (0.103) (.083)
Educational Attainment 0.016 0.059 .075
(0.028) (0.048) (.039)
Income 0.159* -0.177* -.018
(0.036) (0.062) (.050)
Self-employed -0.170 0.234 .064
(0.183) (0.299) (.236)
Mobilization & Contextual Variables
Registered Voter 0.832* 0.204 1.036*
(0.281) (0.450) (.351)
Time at Residence 0.194* -0.108 .085
(0.062) (0.104) (.083)
Urban Resident 0.559* -0.261 .298
(0.165) (0.279) (.225)
Suburban Resident 0.147 0.205 .353
(0.151) (0.239) (.185)
Native Son -0.142 -0.440 -.582
(0.191) (0.400) (.352)
Competitive Race 0.308* -0.515 -.206
(0.127) (0.212) (.170)
Competitive Primary -0.036 0.201 .164
(0.126) (0.213) (.171)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.3 – Continued
Nonbattleground Contact Interaction Battleground Effect
Other Controls
Disabled 0.645* -0.551 .093
(0.298) (0.562) (.477)
Age 0.021* 0.012 .033*
(0.004) (0.007) (.006)
Married -0.147 0.563 .417*
(0.126) (0.219) (.179)
Early Contact 1.596* 0.507 2.102*
(0.331) (0.840) (.772)
Battleground State 0.536
(0.299)
Constant -0.846
(0.183)
N. of cases 2413
chi-squared 312.137
pseudo R-squared 0.108
* p < 0.05; Source: 2000 NAES panel data.
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When we look at the commitment and capacity variables’ effects in battleground
states (column three), we see evidence of what theory leads us to believe we should
see, substantial equity in recruitment. The power of the income predictor (the sole
surviving key socioeconomic characteristic) is canceled in the interaction term (column
2); in fact it is slightly reversed. Jointly, none of these variables explain battleground
state contacting (χ27 = 2.72 p = 0.844). This is precisely what should be seen in vote
mobilization when every registered voter counts equally.
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the uniqueness of battleground states by plotting the
change in predicted probability for changes in income categories for individuals in both
types of states.19 Figure 1.2 shows how income highly structures recruitment in non-
battleground states. Moving from the lowest to the highest income category would
increase an individual’s contact probability by well over 200 percent. In contrast, those
in the highest income categories in battleground states are slightly less likely to be
contacted than those in the lower categories. In sum, the uncompetitive electoral sys-
tems results in inegalitarian contacting patterns while competitive elections result in
egalitarian contacting patterns.
19The contribution of the covariates is set to the mean.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between Income and Mobilization Contacts in Competitive
and Uncompetitive Conditions, in the NAES 2000 Panel
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2.5 Discussion & Conclusion
When it comes to electoral mobilization, popular theory suggests elites will not exclu-
sively recruit advantaged citizens. However, most research of recruitment in elections
leave the impression of an overall strategy that does focus on the advantaged. This
study argues these patterns emerge from the failure to recognize the conditional nature
of recruitment strategies. Rather, campaigns recruit different types of individuals, at
specific times within an election cycle, in order to achieve Disaggregating elections into
two stages and controlling for competitiveness uncovers strategic behavior. We saw an
elite, resource-oriented strategy in the early through end stage of the campaign. In the
late phase however, the strategy turned to general mobilization in battleground states,
but retained its resource orientation in nonbattleground states. These are the behaviors
that correspond to a strategic theory of contacting. Simply, elites alter their electoral
contacting strategies in elections to conditional goals.
Still, this blunt methodological approach to unpacking elite strategic behavior leaves
many unanswered questions. For example, are there any fundamental differences be-
tween national campaigns and state campaigns; or differences between statewide and
local campaigns in the contacting/mobilization strategies? It seems likely that the size
and geographic dispersion of the constituency; the candidates’ resources; citizen inter-
est and involvement in an election; and the ambitions of the elites could all alter the
nature, timing, and breadth of election contacting strategies.
At the same time, it is not entire clear at this point how these factors influence
strategies. Unfortunately, up until now, most research assumed contacting was geared
toward vote maximization efforts. Indeed, one of the big contributions of this paper
is that it forces us to think of contacting as a strategic process that is tailored to
achieve the long and short term goals of different campaigns, facing different strategic
incentives. Future research will continue to test how variation in context influences
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campaign strategies. Hopefully, we will eventually come to understand the strategic
goals furthered by the large number of campaign contacts in uncompetitive elections.
Finally, despite the fact that this article does not answer all our questions, we can
at least be somewhat comforted by the fact that inequalities in campaign contacting
rates are not inevitable. Campaigns do contact a broad and representative segment of
society; even if this only occurs when elections are competitive. In fact, making our
elections competitive would likely substantially undermine the socio-economic bias in
campaign contacting; at least in the vote mobilization stage.
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2.6 Operationalization of Concepts
Table 2.4: Defintion of Select Independent Variables Used in the Analyses
Concept Operationalization
Early Stage Contact Individuals who reported being contacted in the pre-election
survey and were interviewed prior October 31, 2000 were coded
as early contacts.
Late Stage Contact Individuals who only report a contact in the post-election sur-
vey, or reported a contact in the pre-election survey but were
interviewed after October 30, 2000, were coded late contacts.
Income A nine point income category scale created from respon-
dents’ self-reported income. The scale ranges from “Less than
$10,000” to “$150,000 or more.”
Educational Attain-
ment
A nine point educational completion scale created from the re-
spondent’s self-reported of his/her educational experience. The
scale ranges from “grade eight or lower” through “graduate or
professional degree”.
Political Knowledge A five point scale created from the interviewer’s grade assess-
ment of each respondent’s political knowledge. The scale ranges
from “F” to “A.”
Self-employed Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being
self-employed.
Strength of Partisan-
ship
Series of three indicator variables coded one for individuals who
reported being partisan leaning independents, weak identifiers,
and strong partisans. Pure independents are the omitted, base-
line category.
Place of residence Series of two indicator variables coded one for individuals who
were coded as living in an urban and suburban area. Rural
residents are the omitted, baseline group.
Length at residence Continuous variable that tells how many years respondent lived
at his/her current resident. The variable was logged prior to
analysis.
Competitive Pri-
mary
Indicator variable coded one for individuals who lived in states
with primaries held before Senator McCain conceded. These
states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New
York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Vermont,
and Washington.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.4: – Continued
Concept Operationalization
Competitive Race Indicator variable coded one for individuals who lived in states
with competitive gubernatorial or senate races. States with
competitive races include Florida, Delaware, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and West Virginia.
Registered Voter Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being
registered to vote or not having to register to vote.
Battleground State Indicator variable coded one for Arkansas, Florida, Iowa,
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin, else zero.
Married Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being
married.
Age Variable that ranges from 18 to 97.
Disabled Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported being
disabled.
Native Son Indicator variable coded one for individuals who reported living
in Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
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Chapter 3
Campaign Contacts and The
Formation of Party Identities
Given that party identification plays a central role in determining political prefer-
ences, attitudes, and behaviors, political parties have a vested interest in fully under-
standing how their behaviors alter party identities. The existing party identification
literature suggests political parties and their operatives can only alter party-in-the-
electorate through a few indirect mechanisms: strategic positioning on the issues and
the effective performance of elected officials (Achen, 1992; Carmines and Stimson, 1989;
Carsey and Layman, 2006; Fiorina, 1981; Hetherington, 2001; MacKuen, Erikson and
Stimson, 1989; Wawro, 2002). However, there is reason to believe party contacting in
elections can influence party identification.
3.1 Campaign Influence on Partisanship
Given that party identification is viewed as relatively stable, the idea that something
as simple as a party contact might influence party identification seems counterintuitive.
Yet there is reason to suspect that party contacts may help to behaviorally reinforce
party identities.
Converse and Markus’s (1979) behavioral (vote) reinforcement theory of party iden-
tification argues that we create or alter the linkages between ourselves and a party when
we vote for that party (see also Dobson and Douglas, 1975; Howell, 1980; LoTempio,
2002). Specifically, individuals who vote consistently for a party are more likely than
individuals who inconsistently vote for that party to take on–or increase the strength
of–attachments to that party.
At the core of this theory lies an important idea, that latent affect for a party does
not fully translate into an identity without an intervening behavior; the vote. That is,
two steps must be taken in order for an individual to effectively create or strengthen
his/her bond with a party. First, the individual must turn out to vote. Second, the
individual must consistently vote for the party (i.e., make few cross party votes). Only
after taking both steps will the voter have successfully altered her affective/cognitive
links to the parties; strengthening connections to one and possibly moving farther away
from the other(s). In contrast, the nonvoter does not create or strengthen bonds to the
parties, all other things being equal.
If we work through the logical implications of the theory, we see that any force that
alters an individual’s turnout decision or ballot choice also alters the likelihood that an
individual will strengthen his/her bonds with the parties. Consequently, if contacting
alters either the vote decision or the vote choice, then contacting will influence the
formation of party identities.
Fortunately for parties, existing research recognizes that campaign contacts are ex-
plicitly aimed, and successful, at influencing both the likelihood of voting and the vote
choice. First and foremost, abundant evidence exists to suggest get-out-the-vote oper-
ations influence the likelihood of voting (Bennion, 2005; Bergan et al., 2005; Caldeira,
Clausen and Patterson, 1990; Gerber and Green, 2000a,b; Goldstein and Ridout, 2002;
Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Karp and Banducci, 2007; Karp, Bowler and Banducci,
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2003; Nickerson, Friedrichs and King, 2006; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). However,
research also shows contacting alters attitudes toward, and likelihood of voting for, the
parties (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Lefkowitz, 2004; Vavreck, Spiliotes and Fowler,
2002). In sum, the empirical findings of the vote mobilization and maintenance liter-
atures suggest that campaign contacts should alter party identities (albeit indirectly
through the vote).
At the same time, the vote is not the only participatory opportunity campaigns
offer. Campaign representatives also ask citizens to donate money, attend campaign
events, place lawn signs, and so forth (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Brady, Verba and
Schlozman, 1995; Kershaw, 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). If an important
mechanism for identity formation is behaviorally supporting a party, those who perform
these other core campaign tasks should also develop stronger bonds to the parties.
3.2 Assessing Party Identity Change
Overall then, we have strong theoretical reason to believe campaign contacting brings
with it multiple opportunities for individuals to behaviorally alter their party identities.
To test whether Democratic and Republican contacting actually alters the strength
and/or direction of individual party attachments, I turn to the 2000 National An-
nenberg Election Survey general election panel and use self-reported contact with the
presidential campaigns.1
The dependent variable used in the analysis is change in party identification.2 To
1The lack of available data currently prohibit more detailed analyses of the potential pathways.
Simply, most existing surveys do not ask pre-election and post-election party identification questions,
and do not ask directional campaign participation questions let alone about depth of that participation.
2The substantive importance of contacting emerges using a variety of methods (ordinary least
squares with lagged dependent variable, ordered logit, multinomial logit etc...) and model specifica-
tions.
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create the dependent variable, I subtracted the post-election seven point party identi-
fication scale from the pre-election party identification scale. Those who scored zero
maintained their identities. Given that higher values on the scale captured Republican
identification, individuals who scored one or greater moved a step or more Republican.
Those below zero moved Democratic.
To finalize the variable, I recoded the scores for individuals whose values exceeded
one and negative one, to one and negative one. There are two different reasons for the
simplification to three transition states (moved Republican, maintained their current
identity, or moved Democratic). The first is that it is empirically rare, and theoret-
ically unlikely, for individuals to move any more than one step up or down the scale
over the course of a single election cycle.3 The limited number of cases in some out-
come categories undermines the ability to estimate ordered and/or generalized ordered
models.4 Second, without recoding, the best specified models would also violate the
parallel regression assumptions and would be unestimatable. For example, a leaning
independent cannot more than four places up or down the scale. Consequently, the
leaning independent would always have a zero probability of moving five or more spots
on the scale. If we include indicators for leaning independents, these indicators would
perfectly predict failure.
Several considerations led to the decision to analyze change in party identification
rather than predicting placement on the party identification scale. The first consider-
ation is that the analysis of change approach controls for all of the unobserved, time
invariant forces that affect placement on the party identification scale (Wawro, 2002).
3The raw data in 2000 show that approximately sixty percent of the population in the 2000 NAES
panel did not move at all, 26.9% moved one step, 7.2% moved two, 2.6% moved three, and the
remainder moved four or more.
4Small numbers of observations in outcome categories cause convergence failures in gologit2.
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The second reason is this method allowed me to test whether contacting had differ-
ent effects for different types of partisans. Most prior research assumes that individuals
located at each step on the party identification scale behave the same in response to
the same external stimuli (e.g., performance in office). This is a questionable assump-
tion. Since strong partisans have deep affective attachments, anchored in a wealth of
past political experience, it is likely that strong partisans will be highly resistant to
external stimuli (Burdein, Lodge and Taber, 2006; Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber,
2005; Morris et al., 2003; Redlawsk, 2002; Steenbergen and Lodge, 2003b; Taber and
Lodge, 2006). In contrast, independents may be more “moveable” due to their lack of
existing (or a balanced) affect for the parties. Unfortunately, the traditional method
of using a respondent’s lagged placement on the party identification scale to predict
his/her current placement on the scale is not easily modified in a way that allows us to
capture differences in contacting effects by partisan subgroups.5 By analyzing change,
I was able to include partisan indicators (and partisan indicators interacted with party
contact variables) in order to test for conditional effects.6 These tests indicated that
contacts were less effective on strong partisans (available upon request). This fact plus
several additional methodological considerations lead to me to employ a different de-
pendent variable (and a separate analysis) for pure independents, independents who
lean towards a party, and weak identifiers than I use for strong partisans.
5It is also likely that ordinary least squares on such an analysis would violate a number of assump-
tions including constant error variance.
6The failure to account for this varying resistance would bias estimates of the effectiveness of
contacting as the wrong functional form would be specified.
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3.3 Model & Analysis - Independents, Leaners, &
Weak Identifiers
The following model is used to test whether contacting alters the identities of indepen-
dents, leaners, and weak identifiers:
Y = β0 + β1Democratic Contact+ β2Republican Contact
+β3Clinton Favorability + β4Clinton Favorability Change
+β3Net (Bush−Gore) Favorability
+β4Net (Bush−Gore) Favorability Change
+β5Leans Democratic+ β6Leans Republican+
+β7Weak Democrat+ β8Weak Republican+
+β9Gore V oter + β10Bush V oter +
+β11Days To Election+ ǫ
The key variables of interest in the model are the Democratic and Republican con-
tact indicator variables.7 It is worth noting that these contacts are not strictly with-in
party contacts. In fact, the large number of cross-party contacts (e.g., Gore campaign
contacting Republican voters) could result in a substantial number of individuals mov-
ing away from the party they identify with (see Table 3.1).
7An individual was coded one for the Democratic (Republican) contact variable if she reported that
the Democratic (Republican) party contacted her.
34
Table 3.1: Democrat and Republican Contacts Among Partisans Subgroups in the
2000 Presidential Election
Republican Contacts Democrat Contacts
Strong Republican 25% 13%
Weak Republican 16% 11%
Leaning Republican 15% 13%
Independent 9% 9%
Leaning Democrat 12% 15%
Weak Democrat 11% 17%
Strong Democrat 12% 24%
Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, Election Panel
Note: The party identification scale was created using the pre-election battery.
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Overall, the model pits contacting against a rigorous set of controls.8 Most impor-
tantly, the model includes presidential vote choice predictors (i.e., voted for Bush or
Gore). The inclusion of current vote-choice variables controls for many of factors that
move partisanship (Franklin and Jackson, 1983). As such, it provides a strong check
against finding significant contacting effects. As an added benefit, their inclusion also
tests whether campaign contacts add any predictive power independent of the vote (i.e.,
contacts alter identities through other mechanisms beyond vote reinforcement).
Other model variables include: Clinton’s pre-election favorability, change in Clin-
ton’s favorability, Bush’s (Bush-Gore) net pre-election favorability, change in Bush’s
net favorability, partisan subgroup indicators, and a variable that captures the days-
to-election. The Clinton favorability variable proxies for the respondents’ assessments
of the Democrat’s performance in office (see (Cohen, 1999)).9 The inclusion of the net
favorability variable should account for multiple candidate characteristics (issues, char-
acter, and so forth) that might alter the respondents’ party identities.10 The inclusion
of change in Clinton and net Bush favorability scores allows us to capture movement
in individuals’ assessments of these actors. The inclusion of the indicator variables for
different types of partisans recognizes that different groups of partisans may have differ-
ent probabilities of moving. Finally, because the NAES pre-election party identification
questions were asked on different days prior to Election Day, the addition of the days-
until-election variable will account for difference in campaign exposure (opportunity for
events to alter identities).11
8Given the novelty of the idea that campaign contacts can alter party identities, this should instill
confidence in the results.
9The probabilities of moving Republican versus moving Democratic–and maintaining position on
the scale versus moving Democratic–should decrease as Clinton favorability scores rise.
10In contrast, the probabilities of moving Republican versus moving Democratic should fall as Bush’s
net favorability increases.
11The earlier the in the election cycle respondents are asked to give their party identities, the more
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Note that Brant Tests indicate that several of the variables (the partisan subgroup
indicators and the days-to-election variable) violate the parallel regression assumption.
Since the effects of the contacting variables–the variables of interest–do not vary by
outcome category, I use a generalized ordered logit approach to test whether campaign
contacts alter individuals’ identities.12 The generalized ordered logit falls between the
ordered logit and multinomial logit in that it permits the researcher to allow the effects
of select variables to vary with the different categories of the dependent variable.13 This
approach has benefit of easing the ability to interpret the effects of the variables that
do not violate the parallel regression assumption–relative to multinomial logit.
Turning to the results, Table 3.2 shows that campaign contacts alter party identi-
ties. The significant coefficients for both Democratic and Republican contacts tell us
that these contacts simultaneously draw independents’, leaners’, and weak identifiers’
party identities toward the contacting party and away from the other party. Thus, a
Democratic contact equally strengthened weak and leaning Democrats; pushed some
independents into leaning toward the Democrats; and weakened some leaning and weak
Republicans.14
For the sake of interpretation, it is important to reiterate that this movement is
relative to the respondent’s original identity status. For example, we can interpret
likely they are to move from their initial placement.
12This model was estimated using gologit2 in Stata.
13In contrast, ordinal logit constrains the effect of the variables to be the same for each category in
the dependent variables, while multinomial logit estimates a separate effect for all of the variables for
each category of the dependent variable.
14Note that a separate analysis used interactions between the contacting variable and each party
identification indicator in the model in order to test whether contacting was more successful in moving
some classes of identifiers than others. The results suggest the party contacts were equally effective on
independents, leaners, and weak identifiers. This analysis is available upon request. Additional anal-
yses tested whether one party’s contacts were more effective than the other. No significant differences
in the degree and/or direction of the movement were discovered. These analyses are also available
upon request.
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Table 3.2 to mean that a weak Democrat, an independent, and a weak Republican
all “moved” Republican, the same amount, in response to a Republican campaign
contact. However, this movement has substantively different meaning for the each
type of partisan. The weak Democrat became a leaning-independent, the independent
became a Republican-leaner, and the weak-Republican became a strong Republican.
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Table 3.2: Predicting Individuals Who Moved a step Up or Down the Seven Point
Party Identification Scale During the 2000 Presidential Election
Beta
Democratic Contact -0.535*
(0.090)
Republican Contact 0.390*
(0.084)
Clinton Favorability, pre-election -0.004*
(0.002)
Change in Clinton Favorability -0.002
(0.002)
Candidate Favorability Difference, pre-election 0.009*
(0.001)
Change in Candidate Favorability Difference 0.008*
(0.001)
Bush Vote 0.756*
(0.150)
Gore Vote -0.707*
(0.143)
Days to General Election -0.001
(0.001)
Independent - Leans Democratic 0.821*
(0.151)
Independent - Leans Republican -0.111
(0.174)
Weak Democrat 1.014*
(0.154)
Weak Republican -0.303
(0.163)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.2: – Continued
Gamma
Days to General Election 0.002*
(0.001)
Independent - Leans Democratic -.472*
(0.186)
Independent - Leans Republican -.783*
(0.192)
Weak Democrat -.885*
(0.188)
Weak Republican -0.483*
(0.182)
Cut-point 1 -1.249*
(0.185)
Cut-point 2 1.138*
(0.186)
N. of cases 3145
log-likelihood -2862.190
Chi-squared 789.393
* p < 0.05 Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak parti-
sans. The gamma coefficients tell us how much those variables violate proportional
odds assumption.
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In terms of magnitude, contacting appears to substantially influence movement in
party identities (see Table 3.3). For example, an unmatched Democratic contact raised
the probability that the average non-voting Independent stepped toward the Democrats
from .258 (for those with no contacts) to .372.15 Importantly, this contact also helped
to maintain party identities by reducing the probability that the average independent
stepped toward the Republicans from .252 to .165. While individually modest in size,
the contact earns a .201 net advantage for the Democrats by moving individuals toward
them and reducing the likelihood that they move Republican. Note that Republicans
similarly advantaged themselves by their contacts. Their contacts net a .148 advantage.
These results are doubly impressive after we recognize that the model includes variables
that mediate the relationship between contacting and party identities.
Contacting effects are even more dramatic in concert with the vote. A party contact
of an eventual party voter help raised the probability that the average independent
would move toward the party above .5 (.546 for Democrats and .514 for Republicans).
The party contact simultaneously pushed the likelihood that the independent would
move toward the other party to close to zero.
It is noteworthy that these findings emerge despite the inclusion of the vote choice.
This suggests that something inherent in the act of contacting is important for main-
taining/altering party identities, above and beyond its influence over the decision to
vote and vote choice.
The robustness of these findings was put to the test using the American National
Election Study 2000-2004 panel survey. Despite a small number of cases, that analysis
found comparable results using a similar method and model (see the analysis at the
end of the chapter).
15These probabilities were generated by setting the model predictors to their means.
41
Table 3.3: Predicted Probability that an Independent Moved a Step Democratic or Moved a Step Republican in 2000, by
Contact and Vote Status
Non-voter Gore Vote Bush Vote
Stepped Stepped Stepped Stepped Stepped Stepped
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
No Contact 0.258 0.252 0.413 0.142 0.140 0.417
Democrat Contact Only 0.372 0.165 0.546 0.089 0.218 0.296
Republican Contact Only 0.190 0.332 0.323 0.197 0.099 0.514
Contacted by Both 0.286 0.225 0.449 0.126 0.159 0.383
Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak partisans.
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3.4 Model & Analysis - Strong Partisans
Unfortunately, the limited range of the party identification scale results in a situation
where strong partisans can only be observed maintaining or weakening in their iden-
tities. Consequently, in order to jointly test whether contacts alter the identities of
strong partisans, we need to recode the dependent variable from a three outcome vari-
able (moved Democratic, maintained, or moved Republican) to a two outcome variable
(weakened versus maintained partisanship).16
While the model retains all of the predictors used in the prior analysis, all of the
variables in the model were recoded to capture either in-party reinforcing or out-party
pulling forces. For instance, in-party (e.g., Democrats contacting Democratic voters)
and out-party (e.g., Democrats contacting Republican voters) contacting variables re-
placed the Democratic and Republican contacting variables. Similarly, the continuous
variables were recoded (folded) so that high values represent in-party reinforcing forces.
This folding is necessary to account for the fact having certain attitudes implies different
outcomes for Democrats and Republicans.
For example, high Clinton favorability should help predict Republicans who are
likely to weaken, but will also predict Democrats who are likely to maintain. To make
this measure in-party reinforcing, I simply subtracted Republicans’ raw Clinton favor-
ability scores from 100. The candidate favorability difference variable was created by
subtracting Gore’s favorability score from Bush’s for Republicans and Bush’s favora-
bility from Gore’s for Democrats. The full model includes in-party contact, out-party
contact, in-party vote, out-party vote, folded Clinton favorability, folded change Clinton
favorability, net in-party candidate favorability, change in net in-party candidate favor-
ability, and days-to-election variables as well as an indicator for strong democrats.17
16A logit analysis is used to test whether campaign contacts altered the identities of strong partisans.
17The Clinton change variable was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Republicans. The
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Turning to Table 3.4, we see that contacting does not alter the probability that a
strong partisan will weaken. While the contacting coefficients are directionally con-
sistent with theory, neither the in-party nor the out-party contacting variables are
significant. Overall, this finding is not surprising. After all, strong affective attach-
ment takes time, and a consistent field of forces, to develop. As a result, contacting
should typically only have the smallest of affect on strong partisans’ identities. In fact,
the effects may be so small that they might not emerge as significant over the course
of a single election. Strong partisans are just not as pliable as other types of identi-
fiers. That in-party contacts emerge as significant in the multi-election analysis (ANES
2000-2004) at the end of the chapter, supports this slight-movement interpretation.
change in Bush net favorability was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Democrats.
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Table 3.4: Predicting Strong Partisans Who Weakened in Attachment to Their Par-
ties in 2000
Weakened Attachment
In-party Contact -0.141
(0.140)
Out-party Contact 0.121
(0.164)
Clinton Favorability, pre-election (folded) -0.007*
(0.003)
Change in Clinton Favorability (folded) -0.003
(0.004)
Candidate Favorability Difference, pre-election (folded) -0.013*
(0.003)
Change in Candidate Favorability Difference (folded) -0.012*
(0.002)
In-party Vote -0.681
(0.399)
Out-party Vote 0.338
(0.499)
Days to General Election 0.001
(0.001)
Strong Democrat -0.135
(0.133)
Constant 0.313
(0.471)
N. of cases 1947
log-likelihood -816.182
chi-squared 161.784
* p < 0.05
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3.5 Discussion & Conclusion
Existing research on party identification only allows the parties to have a very indirect
influence on the development of party identities. Combined, the mobilization and
behavioral reinforcement literatures suggest this view is wrong. Rather, parties actively
sponsor opportunities for behavioral reinforcement of identities.
The results of this study are consistent with this view, as unmatched campaign
contacts appear to move independents, leaners, and weak partisans closer toward the
contacting parties and away from other party. This is a win-win for the contacting
party. To be sure, parties do not have unlimited power to alter party identities. The
identities of strong partisans do not appear to respond to campaign contacts; at least
over the course of a single election.
Still, that this study finds contacting effects that are robust in the face of a con-
servative model suggests that campaign-citizen interactions play a role in party iden-
tification. The next step is to move beyond the limitations of self reported campaign
contacts and systematically vary and track how participation feeds into the formation
of party identities.
46
3.6 Contacts and Party Identity Formation Between
2000 and 2004
To test the robustness of the single election findings, I apply the same methodologi-
cal approach used in the single election analyses to the 2000-2004 American National
Election Study panel survey.18 The dependent variable remains change in party iden-
tification. However, the change being measured is the change in party identification
from before the 2000 general election to after the 2004 general election. This approach
allows us the best opportunity to explore whether contacting has a measureable impact
on strong partisans.
The theoretical model for this analysis is very similar to the model used in the single
election analysis. However, I altered the coding of several variables to suit the survey’s
panel design.
Rather than a series of dichotomous indicators, these analyses use summary indexes
to handle repeated measures. Most importantly, a cumulative contacting index is made
by taking the difference between the number of Republican and Democratic contacts
over the period. Similarly, the analyses uses the difference between the total number of
all Republican and Democratic votes an individual made.19 Next, party performance
is controlled by a variable that captures each individual’s total George Bush feeling
thermometer score in 2000, and by a variable for change in this score between 2000 and
2004. Candidate evaluations are controlled by Bush’s net feeling thermometer advan-
tage in 2000–which is the difference between Bush’s and Gore’s feeling thermometer
18To the best of my knowledge, the 2000-2004 panel survey is the only survey that lets us test
contacting effects over the course of multiple elections. All the others fail to ask detailed contact-
ing questions and/or to provide both pre-election and a post-election party identification question
batteries.
19The vote indices includes votes for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and President.
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scores–as well as the change between Bush’s net feeling thermometer advantage in 2000
and his advantage over Kerry in 2004. Finally, the model also includes indicators for
the different types of partisans.
Once again, this study tests for contacting effects on strong partisans separate from
independents, leaners, and weak identifiers. Like before, the variables in the strong
partisan model were recoded (folded) to represent in-party reinforcing forces in the
strong partisan analysis. For example, the contacting index was created by subtracting
the number out-party contact from the number of in-party contacts. The voting index
was created by subtracting the number of out-party votes from in-party votes.20
Despite the paucity of cases, the analysis in Table 3.5 recreate the basic finding of
single-election analysis, that party contacts move independents, leaners, and weak iden-
tifiers toward the contacting parties. Looking at the predicted probabilities (see Table
3.6), we see the importance of contacting for altering party identification over multiple
elections. The average independent who received two unmatched Democratic contacts
would be expected to have a .356 probability of moving toward the Democrats.21 In
contrast, three unmatched Republican contacts increased the probability that the av-
erage individual moved Republican by .555.
However, the results of the analysis of strong partisans is not identical to the single
election strong partisan analysis. The likelihood that a strong partisan will maintain
his strong affective attachment to his preferred party rises with unmatched in-party
contacts (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8).
20To fold Bush’s feeling thermometer I subtracted the Democrats’ Bush favorability scores from
100. The folded candidate favorability difference variable was created by subtracting Gore’s feeling
thermometer score from Bush’s for Republicans and Bush’s thermometer from Gore’s for Democrats.
The Bush thermometer change variable was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for Democrats.
The change in Bush feeling thermometer advantage was folded by multiplying the variable by -1 for
Democrats.
21In this subsample no individual received three unmatched Democratic contacts.
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Table 3.5: Predicting Individuals Who Moved a step Up or Down the Seven Point
Party Identification Scale Between the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections
Beta
Party Contacts Index 0.306*
(0.097)
Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000 0.006
(0.009)
Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000-04 0.004
(0.007)
Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000 0.014*
(0.006)
Change in Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000-04 0.013*
(0.005)
Vote History 0.132*
(0.035)
Independent - Leans Democratic 0.705
(0.365)
Independent - Leans Republican -0.613
(0.393)
Weak Democrat 0.341
(0.365)
Weak Republican -0.998*
(0.324)
Gamma
Independent - Leans Democratic -0.799*
(0.371)
Independent - Leans Republican -0.542
(0.363)
Weak Democrat -.807*
(0.394)
Cut-point 1 -0.723
(0.528)
Cut-point 2 1.180*
(0.526)
N. of cases 479
log-likelihood -444.551
chi-squared 143.157
* p < 0.05. Note: Only includes independents, independent leaners, and weak parti-
sans. The gamma coefficients tell us how much those variables violate proportional
odds assumption.
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Table 3.6: Predicted Probability that an Independent Moved a Step Democratic or
Moved a Step Republican between 2000 and 2004, by Number of Contacts
Non-voter
Stepped Stepped
Democratic Republican
Two Unmatched Democratic Contacts 0.356 0.212
One Unmatched Democratic Contact 0.290 0.268
No Unmatched Contacts 0.231 0.332
One Unmatched Republican Contact 0.181 0.403
Two Unmatched Republican Contacts 0.140 0.478
Three Unmatched Republican Contacts 0.107 0.555
Source: National Election Study, 2000 to 2004 Panel
Table 3.7: Predicting Strong Partisans Who Weakened in Attachment to Their Par-
ties Between 2000 and 2004
Party Contacts (folded) -0.391*
(0.194)
Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000 (folded) -0.041*
(0.014)
Change in Candidate Feeling Thermometers Differences, 2000-04 (folded) -0.031*
(0.010)
Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000 (folded) 0.004
(0.017)
Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer, 2000-04 (folded) 0.017
(0.015)
Vote History (folded) -0.069
(0.077)
Strong Democrat -0.018
(0.464)
Constant 0.379
(1.051)
N. of cases 262
log-likelihood -107.750
chi-squared 30.203
* p < 0.05 one-tailed test. Source: National Election Study, 2000-2002-2004
Election Panel.
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Table 3.8: Predicted Probability that a Non-voting Strong Partisan Weakened Iden-
tity between 2000 and 2004, by Number of Contacts
Three Unmatched Out-party Contacts 0.499
Two Unmatched Out-party Contacts 0.403
One Unmatched In-party Contact 0.313
No Unmatched Contacts 0.236
One Unmatched In-party Contact 0.173
Two Unmatched In-party Contacts 0.124
Three Unmatched In-party Contacts 0.087
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2002-2004 Election Panel
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STATE LEVEL VARIABLES
State Percent White 39 0.8 0.1 0.4 1.0
State Opinion Liberalism 39 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0
Adjusted State Per-Capita Income 39 26506 2578 21825 33383
% less than High School Degree 39 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17 39 0.154 0.366 0 1
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18 39 0.359 0.486 0 1
Court found Finance System Unconstitu-
tional
39 0.308 0.468 0 1
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES
Districts with Minimum Black & White Populations
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
Black
1701 10.1 0.3 9.0 11.2
Educational Achievement - Black 1701 0.140 0.121 0 1
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - Black
1701 0.178 0.123 0 1
% Single-parent Households - Black 1701 -0.002 0.112 -0.613 0.497
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
White
1701 10.4 0.2 9.7 11.5
Educational Achievement - White 1701 0.228 0.146 0 0.866
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - White
1701 0.158 0.079 0.006 0.681
% Single-parent Households - White 1701 0.023 0.065 -0.184 0.440
School District Percent White 1701 0.685 0.172 0.098 0.962
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 1701 0.436 0.203 0.005 0.952
Average Instructional Spending 1701 4765 1066 2488 10783
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 1701 8.8 1.1 6.5 13.9
% Rural 1701 0.272 0.327 0 1
Districts with Minimum White Population
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
White
8228 10.4 0.2 9.7 12.0
Educational Achievement - White 8228 0.203 0.133 0 0.914
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - White
8228 0.157 0.075 0 0.681
% Single-parent Households - White 8228 0.000 0.061 -0.307 0.440
School District Percent White 8228 0.863 0.160 0.024 1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 8228 0.330 0.187 0.000 1.000
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.8: – Continued
Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES
Districts with Minimum White Population
Average Instructional Spending 8228 5073 1174 2488 12093
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 8228 7.6 1.1 4.5 13.9
% Rural 8228 0.537 0.397 0 1
All School Districts
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income - All
Public School Students
9506 10.4 0.2 9.3 12.0
Educational Achievement - All Public
School Students
9506 0.189 0.126 0 0.907
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - All Public School Students
9506 0.171 0.076 0 0.833
% Single-parent Households - All Public
School Students
9506 -0.002 0.070 -0.253 0.488
School District Percent White 9506 0.843 0.191 0.006 1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 9506 0.360 0.205 0.000 1.000
Average Instructional Spending 9506 5223 1352 2488 30830
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 9506 7.4 1.2 3.8 13.9
% Rural 9506 0.582 0.402 0 1
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Chapter 4
A Reexamination of the Role of
Statewide Racial Diversity on
Grade Promotion
A good education provides the foundation for a strong economy, long lives, an
informed citizenry, and is generally central to modern life. As such, societies have
a vested interest in identifying those programs and policies that boost educational
attainment. Unfortunately, the United States has done a poor job ensuring minority
and socio-economically disadvantaged students receive an education comparable to that
of their more advantaged classmates. This fact has driven education researchers to
expend considerable effort looking for programs that help these disadvantaged students
excel academically.
Given that localities and states disproportionately control education policy in the
United States, educational attainment by state has also drawn considerable interest
from political scientists (e.g., Hero & Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998; Hero 2007). This
research identified a persistent troubling pattern; states with large African-American
populations tend to have worse educational outcomes than states with proportionately
fewer African-Americans. These researchers offer The Racial Diversity Theory of State
Politics, which argues that this association is largely rooted in statewide discrimination.
A multitude of analyses appear to support their theory.
However, this literature appears to have developed largely independently of the
education outcomes literature, and without appropriate recognition of that literature’s
central insights–that parental resources and substate forces drive outcomes. This paper
exploits both traditions in an effort to rigorously retest the Racial Diversity Theory of
State Politics and to provide fuller understanding of those forces that drive interstate
and intrastate differences in education outcomes of all students.
4.1 Background
The most systematic attempt to understand the origins of the positive correlation be-
tween state diversity and poor education outcomes comes from Racial Diversity Theory
of state politics (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998, 2003b,a, 2007). This theory argues
this association emerges as a result of discriminatory state level policy decisions, with
discrimination increasing as state diversity increases. The estimated effects are substan-
tial, and this research concludes that racial diversity is the dominant explanation for
interstate differences in politics, policy, and outcomes; even relative to socioeconomic
explanations.
“However, the impacts of the socioeconomic variables are not always es-
pecially strong and not always consistent with the expected direction of
impact...In short, social diversity holds up rather well in explaining impor-
tant state political questions relative to the socioeconomic interpretation.”
(Hero 1998, p.145-146)
The central assumption behind this theory is the idea that policy related outcomes
for black students are worse in more diverse states. For those interested in maximizing
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the graduation rate for black students, the conclusion to be drawn from this research
is unmistakable: black students are substantively better off in less diverse states than
they are in more diverse states.
As important as Hero and Tolbert’s (1996) research is for refocusing our attention to
the role discrimination plays in interstate differences in policy related outcomes, there
is reason to believe that this research overestimates the role state level discrimina-
tion plays in education outcomes. Importantly, this prior research does not effectively
account for those forces education researchers tell us drive education outcomes.
In contrast to political science’s focus on interstate differences in statewide charac-
teristics in explaining policy and outcomes, education scholars rarely attempt to system-
atically explain interstate differences using statewide characteristics. When education
researchers do explore state level forces, the goal is typically to identify specific policy
effects. In any event, the state level forces rarely help to explain education outcomes.
Rather, the education literature concludes students’ background characteristics and lo-
cal dynamics largely drive education outcomes. Overall, this literature tells us that the
primary determinants of educational attainment include parental socioeconomic status
(Burris, Heubert and Levin, 2006; Hedges and Nowell, 1999; Skiba et al., 2005; Sirin,
2005; Scott, Bailey and Kienzi, 2006), social network resources (Coleman and Hoffer,
1987; Coleman, 1988; Ralph B. McNeal, 1999, 2001), and peer-effects/concentrated
poverty (Coleman, 1966; Hanushek et al., 2003; Wilson, 1987). Important secondary
explanations include: local capacity and/or commitment to education (e.g., instruc-
tional spending (Balfanz and Legters, 2004)) and the size of educational institutions
(Englehart, 2007; Greene and Winters, 2005; Konstantopoulo, 2006; Rivkin, Hanushek
and Kain, 2005; Walberg, 1989).
Because the models used in prior research on racial diversity did not control for
family characteristics or local forces, we cannot be sure statewide racial diversity, or for
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that matter, any other state level characteristics (education, economics, and ideology)
really shape those factors that influence school districts, which in turn alter individual
students’ education outcomes. While racial diversity may influence outcomes via state
policy, it also might well be the case that individual resources, local socioeconomic
context, and other local factors shape outcomes with relatively little influence from
state actors. After all, the inertia of poverty and local discretion both have the potential
to insulate children from any benefits emanating from state politics.
Still, this is not the only reason to be critical of the idea that the positive correlation
between statewide racial diversity and poor education outcomes stems primarily from
racial discrimination. Namely, in the post Jim Crow Era, representation and political
power tend to grow with increased population size and concentration. That is, as groups
expand, they should become better able to have their wants and needs met by the
political systems at all levels (England and Meier, 1984; England, Meier and Robinson,
1985; Meier, 1984; Meier and Bohte, 2001; Meier et al., 2006, 2005; Jr., England and
Meier, 1989; Selden, 1997). Within a representational framework, we would expect to
see a pattern that directly contradicts that proposed by Hero (1998); diversity should
be associated with positive outcomes. In effect, policy related outcomes should reflect
these competing forces. However, if representational power and the willingness of whites
to set up discriminatory barriers simultaneously increase with diversity, it is possible
that these two normal political tendencies are thwarted or at least ameliorated.
In sum, education outcomes are driven by a complex field of forces. By applying
better methods to a more fully specified model, we will be able to more accurately
assess the role of both state and local factors on outcomes.
This study uses a hierarchical modeling approach that allows state diversity and
other state level explanations to influence student outcomes while simultaneously ac-
counting for local forces and student characteristics. I develop and analyze a set of
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models that predict school district-level grade advancement.1 As more and better data
become available, these analyses will be expanded to the individual level.
The dependent variable used in this study is a migration adjusted Cumulative Pro-
motion Index (CPI).2 Each school district’s CPI score is calculated by multiplying the
probabilities that the school districts’ high school students advance from grade to grade
in sequential years and that seniors earn regular diplomas.3 While the migration ad-
justments add complexity, a CPI score is the probability a student in the school district
will earn a regular diploma from a school district in four years (Swanson, 2003). The
grade promotion score (probability) for each district are calculated using the following
formula:
CPI =
[
RegularDiploma(1999+2000+2001)
Grade 121999+2000+2001
]
∗
[
Grade 12(2000+2001+2002) − (Grade 11(1999+2000+2001) ∗Migration Percent)
Grade 11(1999+2000+2001)
]
∗
[
Grade 11(2000+2001+2002) − (Grade 10(1999+2000+2001) ∗Migration Percent)
Grade 10(1999+2000+2001)
]
1Unfortunately, the lack of student-level graduation data prohibits disaggregated, inter-state com-
parisons at the student level. The lack of school-level diploma and demographic data as well as the
dual problems of intra-district transfers and school consolidations lead to the choice of school district
as the unit of analysis.
2School district grade promotion probabilities (CPI scores) are adjusted using the aver-
age annual percent change in the school districts overall, black, or white populations between
1995 to 2000. The migration information for each school district comes from 2000 census
data disaggregated to the county level. The formula for net migration percentages change is
( International Migration + Net Migration Since 1995
5
)
Population in 2000 − International Migration − Net Migration Since 1995 . Adjusting for migration is cru-
cial for estimating accurate graduation statistics. Immigration and emigration will result in grade
promotion probabilities that are artificially high and low, respectively.
3Note that some school districts had unaccounted for growth from year to year (e.g., there were
more students in grade 10 than in grade 9 the year before). Consequently, a few school districts had
grade-to-grade promotion values above one (perfect promotion). Those with values above 1.45 are
excluded from the model while the remainder was recoded to one prior to multiplying all grade-to-
grade promotion ratios. This is done to keep the grade promotion measure from taking on wildly
unrealistic values when population numbers were small. Different grade promotion value cutoffs and
full exclusion of these school districts do not alter substantive conclusions.
58
∗[
Grade 10(2000+2001+2002) − (Grade 9(1999+2000+2001) ∗Migration Percent)
Grade 9(1999+2000+2001)
]
I use the CPI because the traditional graduation and dropout rates that most states
have reported are “grossly inaccurate (Orfield et al., 2004)”.4 This inaccuracy occurs
because states define dropouts differently, do not always report dropouts, do not uni-
formly collect dropout data across school districts, and do not even report dropouts for
all grades (Orfield et al., 2004; Swanson, 2004). In contrast, the CPI incorporates more
consistently reported data and has the additional virtue of covering more students and
more states.5
4.2 Methods & Model
This study uses a two level hierarchical model to predict the grade promotion proba-
bilities. Level one includes the school district-level summary measures of the students’
background characteristics and other local forces. Level two contains statewide racial
diversity, opinion liberalism, and other important state level covariates. The full model
is:
Level One (School District):
Yij = β0j + β1jLocal Diversityij + β2jAverage Adjusted Income ij
+β3j% Single Parent ij + β4j% College or More ij
+β5j% Outside County in 1995 ij + β6j% Free & Reduced Lunchij +
4School enrollment and diploma data come from the Department of Education’s Common Core
of Data (CCD) program. CCD fiscal and non-fiscal data are for all public schools and public school
districts in the United States. Missing diploma data as well as questionable dropout data, prohibits
the calculation of traditional graduation rates at the school district-level.
5The general lack of diploma data outside these years limits the analyses to these years.
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+β7jAverage Student Count (logged)ij
+β8jPer − pupil Instructional Spendingij
+β9j%Ruralij + ǫij
Level Two (State):
β0j = γ00 + γ01State Diversityj + γ02Finance System Unconstitutionalj
+γ03Adjusted GSP Per Capitaj + γ04State Educational Attainmentj
+γ05State Opinion Liberalismj + γ06Age 17 Mandatory Enrollmentj + U0j
γ07Age 17 Mandatory Enrollmentj + U0j
The variables in level one capture education research’s key explanatory forces. Im-
portantly, this includes summary measures of the background characteristics of the
students in the public schools. Parents’ average adjusted per capita income and edu-
cational attainment capture the socioeconomic background of district students.6 Simi-
larly, residential mobility and proportion single parent household variables account for
variation in social network resources.7 The other local-level variables include: the per-
cent of students free or reduced price lunch eligible (concentrated poverty), per-pupil
instructional spending, average number of students in the school district (logged), per-
cent rural, and local diversity (the percentage of the school district community that
6All state and school district spending and income variables were adjusted with the Department of
Education’s Comparable Wage Indices (CWI) in order to enhance interstate comparisons of spending
and income patterns (Taylor et al., 2007). The CWI adjusts for regional variation in income. Addi-
tionally, the subpopulation income measures were logged to account for a positive, but diminishing
return relationship between income and grade promotion.
7Prior to inclusion, the single parent household measures were regressed on the appropriate sub-
population education attainment and per capita income variables to purge the measures of the strong
association with socioeconomic resources. The residual from this regression was used to capture non-
socioeconomic effects of family type on graduation.
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is white). Note that controlling for concentrated poverty is essential because this can
proxy for a community’s ability to support high quality education and because high
concentrations of disadvantaged students has been shown to lead to worse educational
outcomes; these negative effects are called peer-effects (Sund, 2009; Mashburn et al.,
2009). It is not important for this study’s purposes to decipher which force is at work
should this variable achieve significance. Rather, it is important to attempt to fully
account for socioeconomic effects. Please see more detailed variable descriptions in
Table 4.7 at the end of the chapter.
At the state level, I test the importance of statewide racial diversity for grade
promotion using the percentage of each state’s population that is white (not Hispanic)
in 2000. Note that this paper defines both state and school district diversity in this
manner because traditional diversity indices like the one used by Hero and Tolbert
(1996) assign the same scores to comparable majority black and majority white districts.
This is problematic because the theory does not describe conditions that emerge under
racial homogeneity per se. Rather, the theory describes dynamics associated with a
population moving from homogeneous white to diverse. This measure allows us to look
for the expected patterns at both levels, while maintaining definitional consistency.8
The model also includes the classic political science state level explanatory variables:
economic resources, educational attainment, and citizen opinion liberalism (Erikson,
Wright and McIver, 1993).9
Finally, the model includes indicators for states that had compulsory attendance re-
quirements to age 17 or 18; and an indicator for states where court cases (as late as 1993)
8The use of the Hero and Tolbert (1996) index for the state does not lead to substantively different
conclusion (analysis available on request).
9I use percentage of the state population with less than a high school degree in order to slightly
reduce collinearity with school district level educational attainment.
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found the states’ education finance systems unconstitutional. Raising mandatory atten-
dance to age 18 (Bridgeland, DiIulio and Streeter, 2007) and education equity/adequacy
oriented system reforms are two popular proposed solutions for state educational at-
tainment woes. Yet, to my knowledge, no peer-reviewed study systematically assesses
the effects of adequacy reforms on interstate differences in grade promotion.10 The
descriptive statistics of these variables are found in Table 4.1.
10Note that this study follows Hero (2007) and omits white ethnic diversity as predictor. This is
in part because of the ethnic diversity variables usefulness as a theoretical/operational construct, but
also because it strongly correlates with ideology and socioeconomic explanations. Similarly, the close
association between state diversity and state political culture noted by Hero (1998) leads me to exclude
this explanation from the analyses.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STATE LEVEL VARIABLES
State Percent White 39 0.8 0.1 0.4 1.0
State Opinion Liberalism 39 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0
Adjusted State Per-Capita Income 39 26506 2578 21825 33383
% less than High School Degree 39 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17 39 0.154 0.366 0 1
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18 39 0.359 0.486 0 1
Court found Finance System Unconsti-
tutional
39 0.308 0.468 0 1
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES
Districts with Minimum Black & White Populations
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
Black
1701 10.1 0.3 9.0 11.2
Educational Achievement - Black 1701 0.140 0.121 0 1
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - Black
1701 0.178 0.123 0 1
% Single-parent Households - Black 1701 -0.002 0.112 -0.613 0.497
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
White
1701 10.4 0.2 9.7 11.5
Educational Achievement - White 1701 0.228 0.146 0 0.866
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - White
1701 0.158 0.079 0.006 0.681
% Single-parent Households - White 1701 0.023 0.065 -0.184 0.440
School District Percent White 1701 0.685 0.172 0.098 0.962
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 1701 0.436 0.203 0.005 0.952
Average Instructional Spending 1701 4765 1066 2488 10783
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 1701 8.8 1.1 6.5 13.9
% Rural 1701 0.272 0.327 0 1
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.1: – Continued
Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SCHOOL DISTRICT LEVEL VARIABLES
Districts with Minimum White Population
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
White
8228 10.4 0.2 9.7 12.0
Educational Achievement - White 8228 0.203 0.133 0 0.914
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - White
8228 0.157 0.075 0 0.681
% Single-parent Households - White 8228 0.000 0.061 -0.307 0.440
School District Percent White 8228 0.863 0.160 0.024 1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 8228 0.330 0.187 0.000 1.000
Average Instructional Spending 8228 5073 1174 2488 12093
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 8228 7.6 1.1 4.5 13.9
% Rural 8228 0.537 0.397 0 1
All School Districts
Logged-Adjusted Per Capita Income -
All Public School Students
9506 10.4 0.2 9.3 12.0
Educational Achievement - All Public
School Students
9506 0.189 0.126 0 0.907
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995 - All Public School Students
9506 0.171 0.076 0 0.833
% Single-parent Households - All Pub-
lic School Students
9506 -0.002 0.070 -0.253 0.488
School District Percent White 9506 0.843 0.191 0.006 1.000
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch 9506 0.360 0.205 0.000 1.000
Average Instructional Spending 9506 5223 1352 2488 30830
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) 9506 7.4 1.2 3.8 13.9
% Rural 9506 0.582 0.402 0 1
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In order to get a fuller understanding of the forces that drive grade advancement, I
analyze the model for all students and then by race. Even though we are most interested
in race specific hypotheses tied to the Racial Diversity Theory of state politics, I analyze
a model of all students in order to test whether the basic pattern identified in earlier
research reemerges in these analyses.
The first analyses of race specific grade promotion probabilities examines school
districts that contained at least twenty black students in each year included in the
analyses (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002).11 The next two analyses of race specific grade
promotion probabilities use an identical subset of school districts; those that contain
at least twenty white and twenty black students. The second analysis predicts black
grade promotion. The third analysis predicts white grade promotion probabilities in
these districts in order to eliminate selection bias. The final analysis reruns the white
grade promotion model after dropping the minimum twenty black student requirement.
As a methodological note, it is relevant to emphasize that the use of multilevel
modeling accounts for correlation among observations in “nested” data (e.g., school
districts within states). This correlation biases standard errors and can lead to an
increased likelihood of finding significance if not properly controlled.12 This approach
also allows us to assess the amount of inter-state variance explained by the model.
11Limiting the analyses using the 20 student cut-off drastically reduces the number of school districts
analyzed. Nationwide there are 4,939 school districts in 43 states that had at least one black student
in the ninth grade. Of these, 2670 had more than 10, only 2082 had 20 or more black students;
and 1886 also had at least 20 white students. The removal disproportionately affected the racially
homogeneous states. Only a fraction of the school districts that contain any black students remained.
Montana, North Dakota, and Vermont drop out of these analyses altogether. Note that school districts
in Arizona and South Carolina were excluded because the school districts in the state fail to accurately
report diploma data. However, this weak limiting condition is necessary in order to establish relatively
stable estimates of school district outcomes for the racial subpopulations. Unfortunately, this leaves
a gap in our understanding of how students achieve when present in very small numbers. Still, these
analyses cover approximately 87 percent of all known white students and 80 percent of black students,
nationwide. Coverage of the states analyzed is even better at approximately 96 percent coverage for
whites and 85 percent for blacks.
12The model is estimated using the xtmixed command in Stata.
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Furthermore, multilevel models allow us to simultaneously estimate the effect of district
and state level forces. In fact, this approach allows us to estimate the proportion of
state level variance that the model explains.
4.3 Analysis of All Students’ Grade Promotion
By first analyzing the grade promotion probabilities for all students, we get a sense of
how well racial diversity and other factors in the model predict grade advancement.
Overall, the results appear to support racial diversity’s earlier findings, as grade pro-
motion probabilities rise with increases in the proportion of the state population that
is white (see Table 4.2). Further, the effects are consequential. A ten percent increase
in a state’s white population associates with .024 higher school district level grade
promotion probabilities.
At the same time, it seems prior research overstates the degree to which racial
diversity drives grade advancement. Statewide racial composition’s effect is comparable
to those of the individual background characteristic, local contextual, and policy effects.
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Table 4.2: Random Intercept Model of Factors Predicting the School District’s Over-
all Cumulative Promotion Scores, 1999 to 2002
All Students
School District-level
Parental Adjusted Per-capita Income (log) 0.068*
(0.009)
Parental Educational Achievement 0.206*
(0.015)
% of Parents Living Outside County in 1995 -0.183*
(0.015)
% Single-parent Households -0.324*
(0.018)
School District Percent White 0.049*
(0.009)
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch -0.139*
(0.011)
Instructional Spending Per-Pupil -0.000
(0.000)
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) -0.021*
(0.001)
% Rural -0.007
(0.004)
State-level
State Percent White 0.237*
(0.063)
State Opinion Liberalism 0.019
(0.118)
Adjusted State Per Capita Income -0.000
(0.000)
% less than High School Degree -0.286
(0.189)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17 0.026
(0.020)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18 0.041*
(0.018)
Court found Finance System Unconstitutional 0.039*
(0.016)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.2: – Continued
All Students
Constant 0.165
(0.173)
Intercept Standard Deviation 0.042*
(0.005)
Level-1 Residual Standard Deviation 0.096*
(0.001)
N. of cases 9506
log-likelihood 8731.421
chi-squared 4708.518
* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.
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For instance, equity/adequacy lawsuits appear to have raised the school district
level, all student grade promotion probabilities by .039 points. Note that these law-
suits spawned far more than improving financial equity. Most undertook a series of
expansive system reforms (e.g., the Kentucky Education Reform Act and Arkansas’
Quality Education Act) aimed at achieving better education outcomes. Since each
state implemented a unique blend of services in response to their particular contextual
needs, unpacking the particular bundle of policies that lead to better grade promotion
will await future research. However, it is worth noting that, many of these states in-
stituted comprehensive school reform programs as well as took major steps forward in
systematically assessing and tracking student performance (Murray, Evans and Schwab,
1998). In fact, some of these states hold schools and districts directly accountable for
failing to meet basic standards (e.g., Kentucky, South Carolina, New Jersey, and Mas-
sachusetts)(Fine, King and Janow 2003; Kentucky Department of Education 2000).
Standard-based reform and comprehensive school reform have been linked to better
achievement test performance (Borman et al., 2003; Swanson and Stevenson, 2002).
Perhaps surprising, state compulsory attendance laws had an even greater impact on
grade promotion probabilities. States that had compulsory attendance to age 18 raised
their state’s grade promotion probabilities by .041. To achieve a comparable effect via
state racial diversity, the state would have to become 17.3% whiter; approaching two
standard deviations.
While the results are consistent with Racial Diversity Theory, other traditional
explanations do not fare as well. Statewide education, income, and opinion liberalism
do not systematically relate to school district-level grade promotion probabilities. These
variables are individually and jointly (χ23 = 2.49 p = .477) non-significant. This pattern
reemerges in most of the subsequent analyses.
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Still, the significance of parental resources and local forces means that simply fo-
cusing on state level variables when trying to explain education outcomes will lead to
biased estimates and potentially incorrect inferences. Most importantly, we see that
political scientists need to account for parental resources. The district level measures of
the parents’ wealth, education, mobility, and marital status all help to explain student
outcomes, with effects similar to racial diversity’s effects. When combined with the
significance of the free and reduced price lunch variable, these results affirm the central
role resources play in determining education outcomes.
Finally, grade promotion also depends on the school districts’ racial contexts. The
likelihood of students graduating on time rises somewhat with the whiteness of the
school district. Although, school district racial context effects pale in comparison to
those of parental resources. A ten percentage increase in a school district’s white
population would only increase the district’s grade promotion probability by .004 points.
Overall, these results partly reaffirm prior political science research findings on the
determinants of education outcomes. However, one should not draw final conclusions
from this analysis alone as this analysis does not tell us if these forces affect black and
white outcomes equally. Most importantly, we cannot tell if the association between
high levels of diversity and poor outcome is in fact driven by black outcomes dropping
with increasing diversity–as Racial Diversity Theory suggests. Consequently, I disag-
gregate and analyze the race specific grade promotion probabilities. I begin with an
analysis of black grade advancement.
4.4 Black Students Grade Promotion Analysis
Analysis of black grade promotion probabilities provides a critical test of the racial
diversity thesis. If increases in statewide racial diversity lead to increases in state level
racially discriminatory policies, minority education outcomes should be worse in diverse
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states than in homogeneous white states.
It turns out racial diversity provides little help in understanding school district
level black grade promotion probabilities in this period of time. The results in the
first column of Table 4.3 reveal that statewide racial composition is not a significant
predictor of black grade promotion.13 This result undermines the earlier findings that
black students graduate at higher rates in lower diversity states.
13Statewide racial diversity remains not significant even when I run a model that excludes the local
level variables and the state level policy variables.
71
Table 4.3: Random Intercept Model of Factors Predicting the School District’s Black
and White Cumulative Promotion Scores, 1999 to 2002
Black-Full Black White White-Full
School District-level
Parental Adjusted Per-capita Income
(log)
0.058* 0.057* 0.169* 0.098*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.009)
Parental Educational Achievement 0.258* 0.235* 0.111* 0.145*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.016)
% of Parents Living Outside County in
1995
-0.104* -0.117* -0.265* -0.215*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.017)
% Single-parent Households -0.234* -0.228* -0.541* -0.345*
(0.028) (0.029) (0.045) (0.020)
School District Percent White 0.014 0.018 0.119* 0.044*
(0.025) (0.030) (0.021) (0.012)
% Free & Reduced Price Lunch -0.124* -0.149* -0.091* -0.149*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.024) (0.012)
Instructional Spending Per-Pupil 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
District Student Count, 1999-01 (log) -0.018* -0.016* -0.011* -0.018*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
% Rural -0.014 -0.024 -0.069* -0.009*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.004)
State-level
State Percent White -0.009 -0.021 0.041 0.183*
(0.077) (0.078) (0.058) (0.056)
State Opinion Liberalism -0.127 -0.146 -0.143 -0.065
(0.172) (0.173) (0.129) (0.106)
Adjusted State Per Capita Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% less than High School Degree 0.096 0.101 -0.272 -0.303
(0.265) (0.267) (0.195) (0.170)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 17 0.059* 0.058* 0.028 0.021
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018)
Mandatory Enrollment to Age 18 0.037∓ 0.035 0.036* 0.042*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Court found Finance System Uncon-
stitutional
0.098* 0.099* 0.052* 0.033*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.3: – Continued
Black-Full Black White White-Full
Constant 0.134 0.158 -0.927* -0.137
(0.273) (0.279) (0.270) (0.165)
Intercept Standard Deviation 0.042* 0.042* 0.031* 0.037*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Level-1 Residual Standard Deviation 0.125* 0.125* 0.089* 0.092*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
N. of cases 1844 1701 1701 8245
log-likelihood 1189.533 1094.600 1667.142 7915.297
chi-squared 473.446 445.711 1609.486 3849.048
* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test. ∓ Significant at 0.05, one-tailed test.
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Interestingly, like state diversity, school district racial composition also fails to pre-
dict black grade promotion probabilities. Combined, the strong message is that the
school districts’ black grade promotion probabilities did not depend on the whiteness
of the state or the local community populations. This means that the positive asso-
ciation between local and state racial diversity and outcomes seen for all students is
in all likelihood being driven by white grade promotion sensitivity to racial context.
This assertion is directly tested and affirmed with subsequent analyses of white grade
promotion probabilities.
While racial diversity did not explain black grade promotion, it is clear that socioe-
conomic class and local factors continue to assume a central role in explaining inter-
district differences in outcomes. The school districts’ black student grade promotion
probabilities increase with increasing parental income and education levels. Concen-
trated poverty, high residential turnover, living in rural areas, large school districts,
and high concentrations of single parent households all associate with poor grade pro-
motion probabilities. Note that this model replaces the school-wide summary measures
of parental resource variables with black student parental resource variables. Theoret-
ically, and empirically, black student resources have a greater impact on black student
outcomes than do the resources available to a district’s student body as a whole.
Finally, successful equity/adequacy lawsuits and mandatory attendance appear to
take on even greater importance in explaining the school districts’ black grade pro-
motion probabilities. States that underwent reforms in response to equity/adequacy
lawsuits increased grade advancement .098 points. Similarly, compulsory attendance
to age 17 adds .059 points, while compulsory attendance to age 18 adds .037.
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Black Students Grade Promotion Analysis - Districts
With Minimum White Students
In order to set up a comparison of how the forces in the model explain white versus
black outcomes, I rerun the black grade promotion analysis using only those districts
that also have a minimum of twenty white students. This excludes 143 districts from the
analysis. The results of this analysis (see Table 4.3, Column 2) are virtually identical
to the results of the previous analysis. However, the compulsory attendance to age 18
fails to achieve significance using a directional test of significance.14
4.5 White Grade Promotion Analyses - Districts
With Black Students
While the analysis of black grade promotion probabilities tell us much of what we want
to know (that black students are not better off in less diverse states), that analysis raised
the important question; If black student outcomes were not driving the association
between statewide diversity and the grade promotion probabilities of all students, whose
were? One possibility is that it is the white students’ grade promotion probabilities that
covary with diversity. To test for this possibility, I expand my analyses to white grade
promotion probabilities. These additional analyses also allow us to see similarities and
differences in all of the forces that predict grade promotion probabilities, and help us
sort out the role socioeconomics plays in outcomes.
This study’s third analysis looks at white grade promotion in the same districts
used in the previous analysis in order to see how well the common model predicts white
14While most of the variables are robust to specification, this variable fluctuates between significant
and non-significant in this analysis. Future research needs to flush out whether some state or district
contextual effect is undermining the effectiveness of this law.
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students’ grade promotion probabilities without the threat of sample bias. Overall, the
factors that predict these districts’ black grade promotion probabilities also predict their
white students’ grade promotion probabilities. Notably, statewide racial diversity again
fails to emerge as a significant predictor of the school districts’ promotion probabilities.
For the third time, background characteristics and local policies emerge as strong
predictors of grade promotion. The districts’ white grade promotion probabilities are
a function of all the students’ background characteristics, concentrated poverty, res-
idential mobility, statewide equity/adequacy reforms, school district size, and rural
context.
Still, the contributing forces are not identical. Most importantly, and suggested
by the null results in the black grade promotion analysis, higher concentrations of
whites in a school district associate with higher white student graduation probabilities.
Paradoxically then, black grade promotion probabilities do not covary with district
diversity, while white grade promotion probabilities do. Unfortunately, the origin of
the positive association between white grade promotion and local racial composition
is not directly explained by an extension of racial diversity theory to the local level.
Hero (1998) argues whites create barriers to advantage themselves, and disadvantage
minorities, as diversity rises. Under these conditions, we would expect to see the black
students’ outcomes to covary, not the white students’ outcomes.
In another difference, these school districts’ white grade promotion probabilities are
improved with compulsory attendance to age 18 but not to age 17. More consequential
is the fact that all analyses reflect a positive role for compulsory attendance on grade
promotion.
Finally, I also find that per-pupil instructional spending emerges as significant.
In sum, it appears funding decisions and policies may have conditional effects that
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aggregate analyses do not detect. Note that statewide diversity does not predict per-
pupil instructional spending (see Table 4.6).
4.6 White Students Grade Promotion Analysis -
Expanded
However, by limiting these analyses to school districts with at least twenty black stu-
dents, I leave open the possibility that the outcomes for white students in these districts
are atypical of white outcomes. Consequently, the final analysis uses the exact same
model used in the previous analysis to analyze white outcomes for all school districts
that have at least 20 white students in ninth grade in each year being analyzed. While
the effects of the explanatory forces vary, the results of the analysis of the larger set of
school districts parallel the results from the previous analysis. Nearly all of the vari-
ables that predicted white grade promotion for the truncated set of school districts also
predict grade promotion for the full set of school districts. Importantly, instructional
spending, equity/adequacy reforms, and mandatory education to age 18 reemerge as
predictors of grade promotion.
The results of this analysis depart from the other white grade promotion analysis
in one important way. As suggested by the analyses of all students, white students
appear to do better in racially homogeneous states.
That black outcomes would be immune to variation in state diversity while white
outcomes are susceptible is an unexpected result. If Racial Diversity Theory is correct,
and populations in racially diverse states refuse to provide state services in order to
keep minorities from getting ahead, the apparent consequence is that state level barriers
have the greatest negative effect on white outcomes.
Still, it is premature to assume that the lower white grade promotion probabilities
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associated with high levels of diversity is simply the result of misapplied discrimination.
Several alternative explanations exist for this unusual pattern. For example, one alter-
nate explanation may be a school district selection effect. It is not that concentrated
white populations create better outcomes for whites, but that white families have more
resources that enable them to move into better school districts and states with better
schools.
Another possible explanation is found in the data itself. The grade promotion
probabilities used in this analysis–much like the graduation rates used in previous
research–are for public school students only. The negative association between diversity
and white outcomes might come from a large number of white students fleeing to private
schools, leaving a pool of white students who may not mirror the students who left.
Simple correlations between the percentage of the population that is white and the
percentage of white parents with children in public schools suggest that this might be
behind the association at both the state (.545) and school district levels (.331).15 Under
this scenario, racial considerations may explain the pattern found by Hero and Tolbert
(1996), but not in the way they originally conceived of it. That is, it is the accumulation
of private decisions, and not statewide policy discrimination that is underneath the
association between diversity and poor (white) outcomes. In any case, this is a puzzle
that must await future research.
4.7 Explaining Interstate Variation
While the various coefficients are the key interpretative elements from the analysis, it
is useful to appreciate that the model does a good job of explaining interstate differ-
ences in grade advancement. When we can look at the proportional reduction in state
15The state and school district diversity measures do not highly correlate (.078 and .011 respectively)
with the percentage of black parents placing their children in public school.
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level variance (R22) in Table 4.4, we see that the model explains most of the interstate
differences in grade promotion probabilities.16 The common model explains between
65 percent (school districts’ black grade promotion probabilities) and nearly 80 percent
(all students) of state level variance.
Table 4.4: State-level Variation Explained by the Models
State-level Variation Explained
All Students 0.780
All Black Students 0.653
Black Students in Matched Districts 0.648
White Students in Matched Districts 0.730
All White Students 0.784
4.8 State Characteristics and State Policy
While many of political science’s traditional state level measures failed to predict grade
advancement, it would be premature to write these characteristics off as completely
unrelated to grade promotion. We need to test whether these characteristics indirectly
influence grade promotion via the policy and funding decisions accounted for in my
model. We test these characteristics with two additional analyses.
The first supplemental analysis used multilevel techniques to test whether the state
characteristics predict district level instructional spending. The second analysis used
the state level characteristics to predict those states in which the state courts found
the educational systems unconstitutional. 17
16Since multilevel modeling separately accounts for state and school district level variance, we can
simply compare the variance of the null model to variance remaining after accounting for the covariates.
The formula is R22 =
ψ̂0−ψ̂1
ψ̂0
.
17Note that I do not attempt to predict the states’ likelihood of having different compulsory atten-
dance ages. This is because these laws were passed at the turn of the 20th century or earlier and we
have no reliable data on the state characteristics of interest.
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It turns out that these variables do relate to grade promotion, albeit only through
per-pupil instructional spending. While Table 4.5 suggests that the statewide charac-
teristics are non-significant predictors of district-level per-pupil instructional spending,
joint tests of significance reveal that statewide income, education, and liberalism do as-
sociate with greater instructional spending (χ23 = 10.88 p = 0.012). Note that statewide
racial diversity does not predict per-pupil instructional spending; even in simple bivari-
ate analyses, and a joint test of significance with statewide income, education, and
liberalism fails to achieve significance. In contrast, turning to Table 4.6, we see that
none of the political science’s classic state level variables are significant predictors of
the states that had their education finance systems ruled unconstitutional.18 Still,
these results reaffirm the importance of these characteristics for explaining interstate
differences in outcomes; at least through some policies.
18Joint tests of significance also fail to uncover any association between these variables and a finding
of unconstitutionality.
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Table 4.5: Assessing the Relationship between State-level Characteristics and a Court
Decision that Found State Education Financing Systems Unconstitutional (prior to
1994)
Successful Equity/Adequacy
Court Challenge State
Adjusted State Per Capita Income 0.000
(0.000)
% less than High School Degree 0.072
(0.064)
State Opinion Liberalism 0.021
(0.034)
State Percent White -0.021
(0.018)
Constant -4.694
(5.127)
BIC 62.716
N. of cases 39
log-likelihood -22.199
chi-squared 3.747
* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.6: Random Intercept Model Assessing the Relationship Between State-level
Characteristics and Instructional Spending Per-pupil
Instructional Spending Per-Pupil
Adjusted State Per Capita Income 0.087
(0.061)
% less than High School Degree -710.179
(2649.884)
State Opinion Liberalism 2457.935
(1707.924)
% White - State 707.138
(912.818)
Constant 2870.876
(2143.383)
Constant 664.493*
(76.752)
Residual 1056.163
(7.675)
N. of cases 9506
p-value 0.010
log-likelihood -7.98e+04
chi-squared 13.229
* Significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.
Jointly, these variables do predict instructional spending. Separately, all but state
diversity predict instructional spending per-pupil.
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4.9 Discussion & Conclusion
This study was motivated by the belief that a fuller understanding of racial diversity
(or any state level force) on education outcomes requires a blending of political sci-
ence and education outcomes research traditions. The findings presented in this study
simultaneously reaffirm and challenge political science’s understanding of the role of
racial diversity and the other forces that drive graduation.
First and foremost, while racial diversity does predict grade promotion, this study
paradoxically finds that diversity does not predict black grade promotion probabili-
ties. When we look at black and white grade promotion probabilities separately, we
see that it is white students, not black students who are sensitive to variation in racial
context. Thus, if racial diversity spawns statewide barriers which negatively impact
grade promotion; it is the white students who are among the most affected. Still, this
pattern may arise from private citizens moving between states and school districts or
exiting to private schools. Regardless, these results do not support the idea that ac-
tive, discriminatory state politics is the primary determinant of black grade promotion
probabilities.
Rather, this study supports the idea that student background characteristics and lo-
cal forces drive educational achievement. Parental resources (income, education, mobil-
ity, and household composition), concentrated poverty, and school district size emerged
significant in each analysis. Importantly, these results suggest prior research underesti-
mated the importance of socioeconomics (and overstate the role of racial diversity) in
determining outcomes.
From a policy perspective this research has two messages. First, state level reforms
aimed at equalizing educational resources had a positive impact on student grade ad-
vancement. This suggests that identifying and adopting the elements of these reforms
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should help to boost grade promotion in others states. Second, legally requiring stu-
dents to attend additional years of schooling–particularly to age 18–seems to increase
the likelihood that students of all races will graduate on time with a regular diploma.
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4.10 Operationalization of Concepts
Table 4.7: Definitions of Independent Variables Used in the Analyses
Concept Operationalization
State Diversity The percentage of each state’s population
that is white (not Hispanic) in 2000.
School District Diversity The percentage of the district wide commu-
nity that is white (not Hispanic) in 2000.
Educational Attainment The percentage of the school district’s sub-
population public school parents with at
least a bachelor’s degree.
Income The school district’s subpopulation public
school parents’ CWI adjusted per capita in-
come, logged.
Single Parent Households The residual of regression of the percentage
of subpopulation public school households
that are single parent variable on the pre-
logged, CWI adjusted per capita income vari-
able.
Residential Mobility The percentage of subpopulation public
school parents that lived in a different county
in 1995.
School District Socio-economic Con-
text
The percent of all students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch.
Early equity/adequacy states A dummy coded one for states where, prior
to 1994, a major court case found the state’s
education system unconstitutional. Listed
are the state and the year of the first major
decision: AR (1983), CA (1971), CT (1977),
KS (1972), KY (1989), MA (1993), MD
(1983), NJ (1973), NM (1974), TX (1989),
WV (1979), and WY (1980). Source: CITE.
Compulsory Education to 17 A dummy code one for states that mandate
school attendance to age 17. This includes:
AR, CO, IL, ME, MS, PA, SC, and TN.
Compulsory Education to 18 A dummy code one for states that mandate
school attendance to age 18. This includes:
CA, CT, KS, LA, NE, NV, NM, OH, OK,
SD, TX, UT, VA, WA, and WI.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7: – Continued
Concept Operationalization
School district size Average total number of pupils (logged) for
the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Instructional Spending Per-pupil Average per pupil instructional spending for
the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Average State Educational Attainment Average percentage of the population with
less than a high school degree.
State Economic Resources CWI adjusted per capita income.
Note: All district level subpopulation characteristics come from the 2000 cen-
sus data rolled up to the school district level. School district spending and size
data come from the Common Core of Data.
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